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How to strengthen 
the European Semester? 
Cinzia Alcidi and Daniel Gros 
Abstract 
The emphasis of the European Semester should shift from economic policy coordination – 
intended as the process through which member states commit to common rules and 
recommendations adopted by the Council of the European Union under the surveillance of the 
European Commission – to a stronger national ownership. Coordination of national policies may 
be essential at times of crisis, when cross-country spillover effects tend to be large, but it may 
not be very effective when economic conditions return to normal, as spillovers tend to be small 
and the incentives for governments to coordinate are diminished. Stronger national ownership 
should lead to better enforcement of commonly agreed rules, regardless of economic conditions 
and remove the perception that rules are hierarchically imposed. National ownership could be 
improved by involving the national fiscal councils and the national productivity boards explicitly 
in the elaboration of EU recommendations for national governments. This should be done 
without increasing the complexity of an already complicated EU governance system of 
governance or damaging their reputation as independent bodies.   
Reforms aimed at improving the structural functioning of EU’s economies are of critical 
importance for member states, yet the reasons why specific reforms should be embedded in the 
Semester are not always clear. Moreover, strengthening the Semester by further linking the EU 
budget to reforms undertaken in the member states is fine in theory but very difficult to 
implement in practice. Reforms cannot be ‘bought’ as such and it would be extremely difficult 
to measure the implementation of so-called country-specific recommendations (CSRs) with 
sufficient precision to make implementation a condition for funds.  
The primary role of the Commission should remain to foster coordination in case of economic 
crisis and to provide technical support for reforms when needed.  
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Executive Summary 
• Established in 2010, as part of the European Union's economic governance framework, 
the European Semester is a cycle of economic and fiscal policy coordination within the 
EU. During the European Semester, member states align their budgetary and economic 
policies with the objectives and rules agreed at the EU level. The first European 
Semester cycle took place in 2011. 
• Having assessed the governments’ plans, the European Commission presents each 
member state with a set of country-specific recommendations (CSRs), along with an 
overarching Communication. The recommendations focus on what can realistically be 
achieved over the next 12-18 months. The recommendations adapt priorities identified 
at EU level (in the Commission's Annual Growth Survey) to the national level. They do 
the same for the euro area.  
• The European Semester was created in response to the crisis and had the notable 
purpose of strengthening economic policy coordination and surveillance of member 
states’ fiscal and economic policies to prevent unsustainable policies. Over time, 
however, some of the policy tools used as part of the Semester have been expanded, 
without close attention being paid to why some policies that are national in character 
need to be monitored and coordinated at European level. 
• During the acute financial crisis, the surveillance and coordination of economic policies 
were necessary as the spillover effects were large and in some cases the CSRs did have a 
decided impact. The incentive for coordination diminishes, however, as financial market 
tensions diminish, the economy recovers and spillovers become smaller. 
• Beyond spillover effects, which in practice depend on the state of the economy and are 
often difficult to determine in size or even sign, the main argument to coordinate 
budgetary policies remains the single monetary policy. This makes surveillance of fiscal 
policies, to ensure sound fiscal positions, a key objective of the Semester. Experience has 
shown, however, that beyond times of crisis, this argument has not been sufficient to 
prevent unsustainable national economic policies. 
• Looking forward, presenting the European Semester as essential for growth and 
convergence may turn out to be misleading and even undesirable if expectations cannot 
be met. CSRs, which are the main output of the Semester, have experienced declining 
implementation since the crisis has waned, even if the focus has shifted away from fiscal 
measures. The Semester mostly has an impact on smaller member states whose political 
bodies are genuinely interested in improving the economic performance of the country. 
Political bodies in larger member states are often too self-centred to take any external 
advice.   
• The creation of national fiscal councils and (national) productivity boards constitute an 
implicit recognition of this problem. Their main purpose is to foster national ownership 
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of sound policies, outside the political cycle. In principle, it would make sense to involve 
these national institutions in the European Semester process, so that the CSRs are jointly 
elaborated and endorsed by them. This change is already happening. There is a risk, 
however, that in the end the whole process is driven by national actors, but given the 
complex framework of the Semester, that the CSRs are still perceived as being imposed 
by the EU. This would not help enforcement. Moreover, it is important that such 
institutions are fully perceived as independent – not only of the government but also of 
the institutions at EU level. 
• Formulating recommendations on structural policies and taking a multiannual approach 
make sense, as structural weaknesses in some member states constitute a fundamental 
problem for the sustainability of the Union as a whole. But these should be driven by 
national productivity boards and require policy coordination across member states.  
• The EU can contribute to improving the structural features of member states by providing 
the necessary technical support to design and carry out reforms, following the same logic 
as the recently created ‘structural reform support service’.  
• Specific links between the use of the EU budget and national reforms already exist in 
the form of ex-ante conditionality applied to EU-funded investments. Taking this 
approach further may be attractive at first sight, but both the principle and the 
implementation raise fundamental issues. It is very difficult in practice to assign a price 
to reforms and assess their implementation. In addition, if all countries require reforms, 
all countries should be the beneficiaries, not only those lagging behind. The latter is at 
odds with the fundamental principles of the EU budget for dealing with common 
challenges and fostering cohesion and convergence.  
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1. Introduction 
Introduced in 2010, in response to the debt crisis in the euro area, the European Semester sets 
the timeline for EU member countries to coordinate their economic policies throughout the 
year and address economic challenges. In this context, economic policy coordination is 
intended as the process by which member states commit to abide by common rules and 
guidance adopted by the member states in the Council of the European Union, under the 
surveillance of the European Commission. The Commission undertakes an analysis of the 
budget plans, macroeconomic conditions and structural reforms of member states 1  and 
provides guidance to them by issuing country specific recommendations (CSRs), which are the 
main output of the Semester. This process reflects a much wider concept of coordination than 
the one associated with the notion of fiscal stance, which has only been introduced recently. 
Despite its short history, the European Semester has already been subject to change, both in 
terms of process and content, and more is yet to come. Indeed, the reflection paper on 
deepening the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) published by the European Commission 
(2017) in May 2017, puts considerable emphasis on the European Semester as a key tool for 
policy coordination. In particular, the paper suggests that the Semester could be further 
reinforced by fostering cooperation and dialogue among member states at different levels to 
ensure stronger domestic ownership and to encourage a better implementation of reforms. In 
this framework, a closer link between the yearly process of the European Semester and a more 
multi-annual approach to reforms should also be envisaged. This should help to gauge 
divergences as well as to identify means to ensure proper re-convergence. 
The strong emphasis on structural features and reforms is a new feature of the Semester, 
although supporting structural reforms to create jobs and growth has been one of the explicit 
objectives of the Semester since its inception.2 Yet when it first introduced and during the early 
years of the crisis, the focus was almost exclusively on ensuring sound public finances. It should 
not be forgotten that the Semester was introduced at the same time as the Macroeconomic 
Imbalances Procedure (MIP) and the revised version of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), in 
the wake of the euro area crisis that started in Greece. At that point, building a framework to 
prevent large fiscal and other macroeconomic imbalances was a political priority and one that 
was considered as an economic necessity to rebuild market confidence.  
                                                     
1 In this framework, the Commission also monitors countries' progress towards the ‘Europe 2020’ targets. 
2  For more information on the European Semester, see https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/european-
semester/framework/european-semester-why-and-how_en 
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In its original design, the Semester was a real semester, i.e. a six-month coordination cycle, 
ranging from March to September of each year, the period that corresponds to the preparatory 
phase of budget law in most countries. This was very much in line with the idea of a mechanism 
to coordinate, budgetary policies ex-ante. 
Over time, as the pressure from financial markets started to abate and in light of the criticism 
of the austerity imposed by Brussels, often through the SGP (i.e. the activation of the excessive 
deficit procedure, under the corrective arm, and CSRs centred on fiscal consolidation 
objectives, in the preventive arm), the attention of the Semester gradually shifted to the more 
general issue of how to make economies more flexible and productive. As a result, the focus of 
the CSRs followed a similar pattern. 
In 2015, the European Commission decided to streamline the functioning of the Semester. To 
this end, the length of the semester cycle has been extended by six months, making it a full 
one-year process, starting in November, with the Commission’s annual growth survey, and 
ending in October of the following year, with the submission of the draft budgetary plans.3 The 
purpose of this change was to give national governments more time to involve national 
parliaments, social partners and other stakeholders in the discussion of the policy measures to 
be included in the national budgets. The (additional) six-month period - after the publication of 
the CSRs, in June - is often called the national semester. This change aimed to make the process 
less top-down and to encourage interaction between the Commission and the member states 
to increase national ownership of the policies set out in the Semester and, ultimately, the 
legitimacy of the process. The changes introduced in 2015 also included other aspects. First, 
the number of CSRs was drastically reduced (see section 2), focusing on more targeted, 
integrated recommendations, i.e. embedding several related aspects in the same 
recommendation. For instance, social considerations and objectives, which are now more 
prominent, are mainstreamed into recommendations that are often formally focused on other 
issues, such as labour market policy and education. Second, the Annual Growth Survey now 
also contains a range of social and employment indicators. Third, CSRs were also introduced - 
for the whole euro area. 
The European Semester Spring package 2017, consistent with the Reflection paper, hints at 
another future change: an increased emphasis on the multiannual dimension of the 
recommendations. The need for a multiannual perspective in the assessment of the 
implementation of CSRs seems justified in order to provide a clearer picture of the progress 
made with recommendations adopted earlier. A longer timeframe should allow for the fact 
that, especially in the case of reforms, implementation takes time, often more than one year, 
and cannot be fully monitored in a single-year perspective.   
                                                     
3 In this new setting, two key documents – the reports prepared as part of the MIP and the working documents 
supporting the CSRs – are merged into single country reports, which are released about three months earlier than 
before. 
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This gradual extension of the Semester’s time horizon from six months to one year, to 
potentially a multiannual framework, mirrors changes in the economic situation of the Union 
and its policy priorities. While at the onset of the crisis ensuring fiscal stability through fiscal 
consolidation measures and structural reforms (mostly labour market and pensions) was the 
main concern, the need for financial sector stability became the priority when the crisis spread 
across countries. Boosting growth and jobs and tackling the social consequences of the crisis 
became the priorities after 2015.  
The changes that are now under discussion seem to be moving away from the urgency of 
dealing with (large) cyclical swings in the economy to focus on structural weaknesses in the 
member states. These range from the functioning of the economy to the administrative 
capacity of different levels of government and improving resilience to future shocks. 
It is not clear whether this shift is also an implicit acknowledgement that the enforcement of 
the policy coordination is weak and there are no conditions in place to induce improvement in 
the near future. As will be shown in section 2, the degree of implementation of CSRs has always 
been low, especially in recent years. It well known that the Semester procedures 4  are 
considered by ministries in most member states as an administrative burden and, at political 
level, a constraint on national sovereignty rather than as a tool to deliver stability and growth. 
The creation of Independent Fiscal Institutions (IFIs) could be read as an attempt to test 
whether a decentralised system of monitoring and surveillance could deliver better results than 
a centralised system of coordination under the auspices of the Commission. As will be discussed 
in the paper, it is still too early to say whether this is the case.  
Against this background, the paper investigates the changing nature of the Semester, the 
drivers of such changes and possible ways forward. It offers a note of caution about holding 
high expectations of what the Semester can deliver.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 offers an illustration of the shift in the 
focus of the CSRs and provides an account of the degree of implementation since the creation 
of the European Semester. Section 3 focuses on the concept of economic policy coordination 
and its rationale. This is important because, according to the original design, the integrated 
system of rules introduced by the Six- and Two-Packs is grounded in the European Semester, 
which sets the timeline for policy coordination and surveillance in the EU. Economic literature 
offers an understanding of the reasons why coordination makes sense and why it could fail. 
Section 4 discusses the Commission’s new proposal to strengthen the Semester and the idea 
of coordinating structural reforms. Section 5 considers the concept of national ownership and 
assesses the role of national independent institutions. The final section concludes. 
                                                     
4 The preparation of the National Reform Programmes and Stability/Convergence Programmes.  
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2. The European semester and CSRs 
This section focuses on the CSRs and has a two-fold objective. First, it aims to illustrate the 
evolution of the CSRs and the gradual shift in their focus. Second, it provides an overview of 
the degree of implementation since the start of the Semester, both by policy area and at the 
member state level. 
2.1 The evolution of the Semester and the focus of CSRs 
As mentioned in the introduction, since its creation in 2010, the European Semester has 
undergone many changes and this is expected to continue. Some of these changes are reflected 
in certain features of the main output of the Semester, namely the CSRs.  
The first visible change, before and after 2015, is in the number of CSRs. A simple counting, by 
heading, shows a drastic reduction of CSRs from 253 in 2015 to 166 in the following year.5 It 
should be noted that counting recommendations is somewhat arbitrary as many CSRs now 
embed several sub-recommendations and group precise actions with general exhortations. 
This is especially the case for the structural recommendations (e.g. “pass this law” is often 
combined with “do something more efficiently”). This change also makes it difficult to assess 
any shift in the focus of the CSRs in terms of policy areas, and some degree of judgement is 
unavoidable.  
Bearing this caveat in mind, Figure 1 depicts the share of CSRs by policy area over the period 
2012-16. It shows a clear reduction in the CSRs in the area fiscal policy, as well in labour market 
and pensions reforms. By contrast, CSRs targeting the financial sector as well as social, poverty, 
and growth and innovation measures are on a growing trend, while remaining a small part of 
total CSRs. The category ‘other’ exhibits not only the largest increase over time but has become 
(one of) the biggest. 
                                                     
5 This count is based on the list of CSRs per country, also considering sub-recommendations.   
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Figure 1. Number of CSRs by policy area (% of total by year, 2012-16) 
 
Source: Own configuration based on European Parliament EGOV papers on implementation of CSRs (see 
references). 
These trends seem to be consistent with changes in the economic environment and the shift in 
the policy priority from fiscal consolidation and fiscal stability, as urged at the onset of the debt 
crisis, to the need for financial sector stability and labour market reforms when the crisis spread 
across countries, and, lastly, to boosting growth and jobs and tackling the social consequences 
of the crisis after 2015.  
2.2 The track record of implementation of CSRs by policy area 
It is widely recognised that the implementation record of the CSRs has been uneven. Measuring 
the degree of implementation of qualitative recommendations is a difficult and always 
imprecise task. But all the metrics used to date arrive at similar results: only a small fraction of 
all recommendations is fully implemented.6 
Figure 2 presents an overview of the degree of implementation of CSRs over time and suggests 
a clear decline in the share of recommendations that are fully implemented and an increase in 
those showing limited or no progress.  
 
                                                     
6CSRs are divided into three categories related to the Stability and Growth Pact, the Macroeconomic Imbalances 
Procedure and the EU 2020 national objectives (the so-called ‘integrated guidelines’). Policy recommendations 
regarding fiscal policy fall under the objective of meeting SGP rules, and provide numbered targets (MTOs and 
required fiscal efforts). They can be considered as the most quantifiable recommendations because they mention 
a specific adjustment, but they tend to be non-specific on the measures needed to attain them. On the other hand, 
recommendations based on the MIP tend to differ greatly, being more or less specific. 
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Figure 2. Degree of implementation of country specific recommendations, total 
 
Source: Own configuration based on European Parliament EGOV papers on implementation of CSRs (see 
references).   
It is a matter of fact that enforcement mechanisms do not exist in relation to the economic 
policy recommendations, except for the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) and the excessive 
imbalances procedure (EIP).7 Hence, the implementation of CSRs by member states cannot be 
enforced and depends on the willingness of national governments to take responsibility. While 
this helps to explain the low degree of implementation of CSRs, it does not explain why the 
implementation ratio is in decline.  
To better understand this point, we focus on specific categories of CSRs and on the behaviour 
of member states. Figure 3 is based on a simplified grouping of CSRs8 and focuses on the degree 
of implementation of MIP-related CSRs. It should be noted that the definition of MIP-CSRs is 
quite wide and has become the predominant group in recent years. In practice, MIP-CSRs 
encompass recommendations of a very different nature. As highlighted in the introduction, one 
of the changes introduced in 2015 was the more integrated nature of CSRs; as a result, MIP-
CSRs could include improvement in the judicial system as this is also a condition for improving 
competitiveness. 
Figure 3 suggests that the rate of full/substantial implementation is very low and the limited/no 
progress category has become the largest. The category ‘some progress’ is now about half of 
what it was in 2012.  
                                                     
7 Indeed, the CSRs are the preventive arm of the SGP and MIP. In the case of the SGP, the procedure can be 
stepped up and could lead to sanctions. 
8 CSRs are grouped into three broad categories: Stability and Growth Pact, MIP and others. 
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Figure 3. Degree of implementation of CSR under MIP 
 
Source: Own configuration based on data from European Parliament (2017), “At a Glance: Implementation of 
Country Specific Recommendations under MIP”, 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2015/542650/IPOL_ATA(2015)542650_EN.pdf).  
Figure 4 attempts to provide more detail on the degree of implementation of CSRs by policy 
area, following the same criterion to identify CSRs as in Figure 1, focusing only on the latest 
available year, which is 2016.  
Figure 4. Degree of implementation of CSRs by policy area, 2016 
 
Source: Own configuration based on European Parliament EGOV papers on implementation of CSRs (see European 
Parliament, 2013, 2014 a&b, 2015 a&b, 2016 a&b and 2017 a,b,c&d). 
17
52
44 46
58
78
43
51 47
40
5 5 5 7
2
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2011/12 2013 2014 2015 2016
Limited/no progress Some progress Fully/Substantial progress
11
10
10
0
6
8
19 19
19
102
18
4
13
14
20
9
11 8
30
127
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Full/Substantial progress Some progress No/limited progress
10 | ALCIDI & GROS 
 
Consistent with the broad picture emerging from Figure 3, few reforms have been fully 
implemented. Moreover, there are some policy areas where implementation has been 
particularly poor, most notably pensions and product/service markets reforms. By contrast, 
financial stability and growth and innovation are the two areas with the largest share of CSRs 
that have shown some progress in the implementation.       
The Commission Communication on the 2017 European Semester, issued in May 2017, 
proposes that the assessment of the implementation of CSRs should be made both from a 
yearly and a multiannual perspective. The emphasis on the multiannual dimension relates 
particularly to structural reforms and acknowledges that they take time, usually more than one 
year, to be adopted, implemented and to show their effect. Based on this observation, the 
Commission made a new assessment of the implementation of the CSRs. As shown in Figure 5, 
the exercise reveals that around two-thirds of CSRs issued until 2016 have been implemented 
with at least ‘some progress”.9 
Figure 5. Multiannual perspective of CSRs implementation: Yearly assessment (left) versus 
multiannual assessment (right)  
 
Source: European Commission, May 2017 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-1339_en.htm). 
This new approach leads to a more favourable picture regarding member states’ 
implementation of recommendations than does the yearly assessment. While a multiannual 
framework makes sense in theory, the Commission has not published the details of the 
methodology, which makes it difficult to assess the value of the new approach. 
                                                     
9 The methodology is currently not available.  
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2.3 The track record of CSRs implementation by member state   
In order to understand the reason for the low implementation rate, we look at the behaviour 
of member states. Alcidi & Gros (2015) note that implementation tends to vary with the size of 
the country. Large countries have the lowest record of implementation.  
Figure 6 shows the average degree of implementation by member state between 2012 and 
2016. Among the euro area member states, Germany and Luxembourg have the largest shares 
of no/limited progress in the implementation of the recommendations. Countries that had an 
adjustment programme, such as Portugal and Ireland, or were under strain, such as Spain, 
exhibit more than 60% of CSRs with some progress. Clearly none of the large countries is an 
exemplary model when it comes to implementing CSRs, although oddly enough the UK seems 
to be an exception. Small countries seem to comply more. 
Figure 6. Implementation of CSRs by country, average rate 2012-16 
 
Note: Countries are sorted according to the limited/no progress, from smallest to largest.  
Source: Own configuration based on European Parliament documents. 
 
From a procedural point of view, the Semester in general and the CSRs in particular are 
considered by the administrations of most member states as a heavy burden. From a content 
perspective, it is often perceived at the political level as a constraint on the ability of elected 
national governments to choose what is best for their country according to the interest of the 
people they represent. This seems to be the case, especially in large countries or for those that 
were not hit by the crisis. 
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For this reason, as will be argued in more detail in section 5, the possibility of relying on national 
institutions that are independent of the government and the political cycle, but that are also 
perceived as fully national, to monitor economic policy developments is important in order to 
prevent the emergence of imbalances of a different nature. 
2.4 A case of structural reform: The Jobs Act in Italy  
As the surprisingly good score of the UK in the implementation of reforms might suggest, it is 
unclear to what extent measures taken by national governments are driven by CSRs or by the 
domestic agenda. It is quite unrealistic to expect, especially after Brexit, that the 
implementation of CSRs would represent a priority for the UK government. More likely, there 
was a certain alignment between the position of the government and what was recommended 
within the framework of the Semester. This reasoning could also be applied to other cases. 
Labour market reforms in the direction of combating segmentation of the market and removing 
rigidities were the leitmotiv of the CSRs for Italy between 2011 and 2014, as highlighted in the 
box below.  
Box 1. Italy CSRs on labour market reforms 
2011: Reinforce measures to combat segmentation in the labour market, also by 
reviewing selected aspects of employment protection legislation including the 
dismissal rules and procedures and reviewing the currently fragmented unemployment 
benefit system taking into account the budgetary constraints. 
2012: Adopt labour market reform as a priority to tackle the segmentation of the 
labour market and establish an integrated unemployment benefit scheme. 
2013: Ensure the effective implementation of the labour market and wage-setting 
reforms to allow better alignment of wages to productivity. 
2014: Evaluate, by the end of 2014, the impact of the labour market and wage-setting 
reforms on job creation, dismissal procedures, labour market duality and cost 
competitiveness, and assess the need for additional action. 
Source: European Parliament (2014b). 
The Italian labour reform came in 2014 with the so-called Jobs Act. Law 183 intended to 
fundamentally change Italian industrial relations. It is unclear to what extent this was the result 
of the European process of policy coordination or the attempt to complete a reform process 
that had begun in the mid-1990s. It has three key elements. First, it introduced a new type of 
contract, the contratto a tutele crescenti – implying a substantial reduction in a firm’s obligation 
to reinstate workers they had invalidly fired. Second, the law weakened the legal constraints 
on firms intending to monitor workers through electronic devices; and third, it introduced new 
incentives for firm to use temporary contracts.  
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It is still difficult to assess the impact of such reforms on Italy’s economy, given the relative 
newness of the regime, but it is also difficult to disentangle the effect of the reform from other 
factors. First results, as reported in Fana et al. (2017), suggest that the expected boost in 
employment growth has not materialised, and an increase in the share of temporary contracts 
over the open-ended ones is observed, as is also an increase in part-time contracts among new 
permanent positions. 
Based on this example, we ask the following questions: What would be the rationale for 
coordinating such reforms at EU level? What kind of spillover effects should we expect? The 
next section attempts to provide an overview of the theoretical setting for policy coordination. 
In addition, in the context of a new potential framework whereby EU funds could be used to 
financially support the implementation of reforms, we ask how could this reform be “priced”. 
We address this question in section 4.1.    
3. Economic policy coordination: Rationale and limits 
The Six-and the Two-Packs, introduced in 2011, represent the legal framework to reinforce 
both fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance via the European Semester for Economic Policy 
Coordination, under which budget plans and reform programmes are scrutinised ex ante by the 
Commission. They are intended to ensure that fiscal targets are not jeopardised and excessive 
macroeconomic imbalances are prevented. What was the rationale for such a change? 
3.1 The rationale 
In the context of a monetary union in which monetary sovereignty has been relinquished, if 
one excludes forms of common and centralised resources, the coordination of national 
economic policies is widely considered as desirable to reduce the spillover effects emerging 
from country-specific disturbances, i.e. asymmetric shocks. This coordination serves as the tool 
to internalise externalities and its absence leads to suboptimal outcomes. 
Most of the existing literature on spillover effects in the context of EMU has focused on fiscal 
externalities, namely a situation in which the source of the shocks is fiscal policy. Few pieces of 
research consider potential spillover effects that are generated by different sources, in 
particular structural reforms. One rare example is the report on spillover effects by the 
European Commission (2006), which focuses on fiscal structural reforms, namely the reform of 
pensions or taxation systems. Since such reforms affect domestic prices, wages and labour 
supply, they could be the source of a cross-country spillover effect. However, obtaining 
approval of such reforms tends to entail a long political process, whose implementation is 
gradual and the effects appear with a time lag. These features make it very difficult to measure 
and isolate the effects of specific reforms on the domestic economy and even much less the 
effect on other countries. 
The literature on cross-country spillover effects mostly considers how a fiscal policy shock in 
one country could spill over to other countries and affect output and prices. This can occur 
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through different channels: namely the trade channel (imports), the price channel (relative 
price changes), the interest rate channel (the common interest rate changes in response to a 
situation specific to one country) and, in special cases such as deep recessions or crises, the 
financial market channel (e.g. contagion).10 11 In the framework of this literature, an ex-ante 
cooperative approach that reduces the discretionary use of fiscal policy could lead to a superior 
outcome for the Union as a whole. This is one of main arguments underlying the Maastricht 
design of fiscal governance and fiscal rules in EMU.  
At the inception of EMU, it was thought that at most it would face moderate asymmetric 
shocks, made rare by a common commitment to fiscal soundness. Reality turned out to be 
different. On the one hand, unlike what was assumed in the fiscal governance framework, not 
only do fiscal shocks matter; on the other hand, member states’ commitment to sound fiscal 
policies, through policy coordination, was not so strong after all. 
In practice, the degree of fiscal coordination that is achieved depends on the trade-off between 
the specific needs of each national government, reflecting political preferences, national 
constraints or specific shocks, and the sign and magnitude of the spillovers.12 A key problem is 
that the latter tend to be uncertain and the national perspective tends to be dominant. 
While cross-country spillover effects are the reason why fiscal coordination is desirable, shocks 
of a different nature, e.g. demand versus supply and temporary versus permanent, tend to 
impact other countries in different ways and are transmitted through different channels. Even 
the sign of their impact can vary depending on the state of the economy. The crisis has shown 
that additional non-traditional channels may exist in turbulent times, with financial market 
mechanisms likely to play a prominent role, and that traditional channels may work in a 
different way according to the macroeconomic and financial circumstances as they interact 
with other channels.  
In normal times, the spillover effects of a fiscal shock (either negative or positive) could be of 
either sign, as argued in Belke & Gros (2009). Belke & Osowski (2016) estimate that in the EMU, 
fiscal spillover tends to be of a limited size, although in some country groups the impact can be 
larger. In this case, it seems that the rationale for coordination is limited. In special cases, such 
as when monetary policy is at zero lower bound and the economy is in a ‘liquidity’ trap, or in 
the case of a financial crisis, the nature of the spillover effects changes radically. For instance, 
in the case of a financial or banking crisis, dysfunctional markets tend to amplify shocks, driven 
by panic or herd behaviour. Under these circumstances, an expansionary fiscal stance could be 
                                                     
10 See Alcidi et al. (2015) for a detailed overview on fiscal spillover effects. 
11 This argument is consistent with the approach at EU level. The European Commission, when explaining why ex 
ante fiscal coordination is desirable, uses the following argument: “Major economic reforms in one member state 
can cause economic spillover effects on other member states. Such spillover effects are all the more relevant in 
an Economic and Monetary Union, as the crisis has underlined. Major economic reforms can produce economic 
spillover effects on other member states via trade and competitiveness and via financial markets”. 
12 See Alesina &Wacziarg, 1999. 
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desirable for the Union, if monetary policy is at zero lower bound and this helps propagate the 
positive effects of the stimulus, or disastrous if the policy is perceived as jeopardising the 
solvability of one member state.  
Overall, it appears that the nature of these spillover effects changes according to the regime 
under which the economy works. From an economic point of view, this implies that the 
rationale for policy coordination changes from one regime to another.   
3.2 The limits 
One conclusion we can draw from the section above is that one size does not fit all. The degree 
of economic policy coordination should be adapted to different economic circumstances, but 
it is almost impossible to design a rules-based system that can account for such different 
circumstances. In fact, the system of fiscal governance that emerged after 2010 attempts to do 
so by designing different procedures (EDP, MIP, in-depth review and country adjustment 
programme), which entail different degrees of intrusion from the central level into national 
fiscal policy. This varies according to the potential spillover effects that economic conditions in 
one country could have on others and on the Union as a whole.13  
Besides the design of the coordination mechanisms, the experience of the crisis has shown that 
economic policy coordination, including enforcement, is difficult to achieve ex-ante for a 
number of reasons. There are economic, political economy and legitimacy considerations that 
can explain such an outcome. 
From an economic point of view, even assuming that maximum coordination can be achieved, 
as explained above, little is known about how spillover effects work. This is particularly the case 
when they are driven by financial markets and when they are triggered by structural reforms. 
This means that gains from policy cooperation are likely to be small and/or uncertain. 
Therefore, either coordination does not happen or it happens only in very dramatic situations, 
when the spillover effects have started to materialise. In these cases, coordination is often 
forced and costly.       
Related to this consideration is the political economy perspective, which ponders the likely 
short-term costs and the potential long-term gains. In this perspective, incumbent politicians 
may perceive the political cost of undertaking difficult structural reforms or budget cuts to be 
higher than the benefits of ensuring long-term sustainability. Likewise, certain measures may 
be recognised as important for the Union, but not deemed necessary for the country they 
represent. This may also lead to a lack of coordination. 
Finally, yet importantly, legitimacy consideration can lead to an impasse in the coordination 
process. Commitments leading to policy coordination are legitimised by the fact that the 
Treaties, in which coordination is embedded, were signed by democratically elected countries. 
                                                     
13 See Alcidi et al. (2014).  
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Moreover, EU decisions are adopted in the Council by the member states, which are backed by 
national parliaments. However, democratic expression in member states, for instance through 
referenda, could lead to a rejection of the commitments derived by such Treaties or decisions. 
This is a typical time-inconsistency problem, which could lead to an existential crisis, as 
happened after 2010. 
Overall, for all these reasons, economic policy coordination that ultimately relies on the will of 
governments to cooperate is likely to fail in a number of circumstances. 
4. What future for the European Semester? 
For the two main reasons explained above, namely the low implementation of CSRs and the 
limits to coordination, it may not be strategically wise to exaggerate what can be achieved 
through policy coordination in the framework of the European Semester. By contrast, the 
European Commission’s reflection paper seems to have chosen the opposite approach, by 
stressing the role of the Semester with reference to three points.   
First, the paper (European Commission (2017c) presents the Semester as a tool to “foster 
further the cooperation and dialogue with member states, involving also national parliaments, 
social partners, National Productivity Boards and other stakeholders, to ensure stronger 
domestic ownership and encourage better reform implementation”. In fact, the idea to involve 
national stakeholders is not pursued or made concrete in the document. Besides the extension 
of the Semester cycle to the promote participation of national stakeholders, which has already 
happened, it is unclear what else could be done in terms of further dialogue and what this could 
deliver. 
Second, the document also claims that “[n]ational policies matter for convergence, but their 
coordination under the European Semester is essential to maximise their effectiveness”; and 
third “[t]he success of the Europe 2020 strategy crucially depends on member states 
coordinating their efforts”. There is no empirical evidence or theoretical argument to prove 
that policy coordination leads to convergence or that the success of the EU2020 strategy 
“crucially depends” on the coordination efforts of member states. 
Of course, this does not mean that national policies are unimportant or that EU2020 objectives 
are negligible. Policies aiming to improve the structure of the economy in member states are 
of crucial importance. The weak link is the coordination argument.   
Let us consider an example. Why would the convergence and the success of the Europe 2020 
Strategy depend on the coordination of German efforts to “[s]timulate competition in business 
services and regulated professions" and on Italian action to “[p]romptly adopt and implement 
the pending law on competition and address the remaining restrictions to competition”? As 
argued above, even for fiscal policy the need for coordination is not self-evident outside 
exceptional periods of crisis. Estimates suggest that a fiscal expansion in Germany has almost 
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no effect in Spain.14 The effects of a product market reform (PMR) are likely to be even smaller, 
apart from the problem that we are not able to measure them, not even in the country in which 
they take place. In addition, the PMR in Germany, other than opening a domestic market to 
more competition, potentially from other countries, should result in higher German 
competitiveness. It is unclear whether this would favour cross-country convergence.    
It should be recognised that enlarging the scope of the European Semester to include any policy 
under the general umbrella of EU policy coordination cannot be justified by the need for cross-
country coordination. 
4.1 EU budget for structural reforms 
In the framework of the new discussion on the reforms and the Semester. The Commission’s 
Reflection Paper refers to the possibility of envisaging schemes whereby reforms in member 
states are supported by the EU budget. 
This proposal is consistent with the findings of recent literature15 presenting evidence that 
structural reforms can have short-run costs – and long-run benefits – and for this reason should 
be accompanied by supportive fiscal policy. This argument is reinforced by the fact that reforms 
are even more costly in times of crisis, when they could even amplify the recession and fiscal 
policy is unlikely to be expansionary, but this is also the time when reforms are more likely to 
occur, given the political momentum. Following this argument, mechanisms to financially 
support member states undertaking reforms can make sense, from an economic point of view. 
Financial support for reforms is not a new idea. It was first presented in 2012, in the European 
Commission (2012) proposal for “A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary 
union: Launching a European Debate”, and embedded in the contractual arrangements. In 
essence, it suggested that the implementation of structural reforms in euro area member 
states could be facilitated by setting up a mechanism of contractual arrangements to be agreed 
between the Commission and the state concerned. The system was supposed to be integrated 
into the European surveillance framework and designed to implement the CSRs, which typically 
focus on a sound fiscal position, competitiveness and financial stability, potentially requiring 
costly reforms. The reforms taken up in the contractual arrangements would be financially 
supported, in principle as part of the EU budget, as a complement to the discipline 
requirements. The proposal also contained a discussion of the procedure for granting financial 
support and potential withdrawal of support. 
In the end, the contractual arrangements never saw the light of day. Other than a lack of 
sufficient political backing, a key issue related to the difficulty of 'pricing' each specific reform, 
                                                     
14 See for instance Belke & Osowski (2016). 
15 See for instance IMF (2016). 
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but also to the question of how to assess the implementation of reforms and potentially take 
the decision to withdraw support.  
That said, some specific forms “EU budget funds for reforms” already exist in practice. As 
explained in Box 1, since 2014, access to European Structural and Investment (ESI) Funds 
depends on meeting ex-ante certain conditions. The rationale for the ex-ante conditionality 
(ExAC) is that the effectiveness and the durability of the impact of public investment can be 
negatively affected by regulatory, administrative and institutional weaknesses. In the 2014-20 
programming period of the ESI Funds, addressing such flows is set as requisite for making the 
investment possible. Conditions are of a different nature and can include specific reforms 
contained in the CSRs. The narrative evidence, based on the European Commission’s analysis 
reported in the Box 1, suggests that the approach has been quite successful. Therefore, it may 
be tempting to interpret this achievement as a signal that the approach should be taken further 
and EU budget funds should be used to support reforms at large, outside ESI.  
It should be noted, however, that the examples reported refer to very specific policy areas, 
matters or measures at local level. The reforms considered are often relevant for the particular 
use of the conditional funds considered; they are never structural reforms having large 
geographical and cross-sectoral impacts. In the case of very broad reforms, e.g. improving the 
efficiency of the public administration or increasing the flexibility of the labour market, which 
are most common in the European Semester, a potential link with the use of EU budget funds 
and the reforms will be less straightforward. This is also the case owing to the attempt to reduce 
the number of CSRs and streamline them. A “price” should be assigned to any reform and its 
implementation assessed, with the funds potentially withdrawn if the assessment is negative. 
These are all very difficult tasks.  
More fundamentally, such conditionality may appear debatable because of the nature of 
reforms and who is the beneficiary. One could question whether any country could potentially 
benefit from this mechanism. If one assumes that different countries should be treated 
differently, on which basis could a discriminatory approach be justified? If, by contrast, 
countries should all be treated equally when they implement a structural reform, one could 
question whether this is an appropriate use of the common funds. For instance, should EU 
funds be made conditional on the adoption of a law on competition or any other law? Should 
Germany and Romania benefit from it in the same way?  
While the EU budget has evolved dramatically over time in terms of structure, procedures and 
objectives, economic convergence and cohesion remain key objectives. 
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Box 1. Ex-ante conditionality in the ESI Funds 
One of the key reforms for the 2014-20 programming period of the ESI Funds was the introduction 
of the ex-ante conditionality (ExAC). While linked to support from the ESI Funds, conditionality aims 
to tackle persistent bottlenecks to the efficient implementation of investment projects, both at 
horizontal and sectoral level. Ex-ante conditionality provides an incentive for member states to 
implement structural changes and policy reforms, including those linked to the relevant country-
specific recommendations.  
There are 48 kinds of ExAC established in the legislative framework of the ESI Funds.  
These include: i) conditions linked to horizontal aspects of programme implementation, applicable to 
all ESI Funds, ii) sector-specific conditions for relevant investment areas eligible for support under 
cohesion policy (co-financed by the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund 
and the Cohesion Fund) and iii) conditions linked to the use of two specific Funds, i.e. the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund.  
Meeting such conditions should contribute to improve the functioning of certain sectors, and the 
incentive provided by the future access to funds should work in a positive way. 
While a full accounting and assessment of this new instrument does not yet exist, the Commission 
has collected narrative evidence based on the experience of several member states.* According to 
this evidence, ExAC is coherent with the European Semester and has triggered the following reforms: 
- addressed delays and shortcomings in transposition of the EU acquis (e.g. in the energy, water 
and waste sectors); 
- helped improve policy frameworks, thereby improving the quality and legality of relevant 
investments, not only those co-financed by ESI Funds;  
- supported the implementation of EU climate policies;  
- despite the absence of a legal link between CSRs and ExACs, in several MS, they speeded up 
execution of reforms and provided the foundation for additional reforms, including 
strengthening a national employment agency and specific health and educational initiatives; 
- aimed to ensure that funding was targeted to the people more in need; and   
- resulted in improved coordination between national and regional authorities in the MS, 
improving the communication flow among ministries, agencies, regional and local level 
government and other stakeholders. 
*See European Commission (2017b).  
 
Ex-post conditionality appears even more difficult to devise and apply. The Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) foresees the possibility of fines in case of non-compliance with the commitments to 
meet the Council recommendations. This mechanism is very similar in principle to ex-post 
conditionality. Historically no fines have ever been imposed under the SGP. Under the new 
fiscal framework introduced after 2010, the failure of a member state to comply with EU 
20 | ALCIDI & GROS 
 
economic governance procedures (EDP and MIP), will trigger – in addition to a pecuniary 
sanction – a procedure for the partial or total suspension of the ESI Funds.16  
Such kinds of measures were envisaged for Hungary in 2012 and Portugal and Spain in 2016. 
Since Hungary is not part of the euro area, the Commission could only propose a suspension of 
ESI Funds, whereas for Spain and Portugal pecuniary sanctions were also triggered. 
In 2012, the Council decided to withhold cohesion fund money for Hungary and suspend the 
scheduled commitments.17  As soon as the Hungarian government reacted with corrective 
measures, the suspension of commitments from the fund was lifted.18 
Despite a Council decision asserting a lack of effective action under the EDP, in 2016, Spain and 
Portugal received a symbolic fine of €0.19  Following that and in accordance with EU fiscal 
framework, the Commission opened a consultation (Structured Dialogue) with the European 
Parliament to discuss the suspension of part or all of the commitments or payments for the 
programmes related to the ESI Funds.20 In the end, a majority of the Members of the European 
Parliament opposed the Commission’s proposition and the suspension did not take place. 
These cases show how difficult and unlikely it is to impose ex-post measures, even in the case 
of the SGP, where one can judge implementation on relatively clear numerical targets (e.g. 
deficit or debt). As mentioned above, for most CSRs that entail structural reforms there is no 
clear metric for assessing the implementation, nor a clear timetable, making it excessively 
difficult to sanction the non-implementation of CSRs with a pecuniary measure like the 
withdrawal of funds.  
4.2 EU administrative support for reforms 
The difficulty of designing an effective system of monetary incentives and punishment inducing 
EU member states to introduce reforms does not mean that reforms are not important. There 
                                                     
16 Under the EDP, sanctions are (automatically) enacted in the event of repeated failure of a member state to take 
action in response to the Council’s recommendations. Following a Council decision establishing that no effective 
action has been taken under the EDP, the European Commission is under an obligation to also propose the partial 
or total suspension of payments and commitments under the ESI. A structured dialogue with the European 
Parliament is required in this case. Under the MIP, the trigger is the failure to submit a sufficient corrective action 
plan following two successive recommendations from the Council.   
17 7513/12 Press Release Council Conclusions, 3153rd Council meeting, Economic and Financial Affairs, Brussels, 
13 March 2012 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press/councilmeetings?pagenum=2 - consulted 13 April 2012).  
18  See Commission announcement (http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/sgp/2012-05-30-
edp_en.htm).  
19 Council decision 12-07-2016 (www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/07/12-portugal-spain-
excessive-deficit/). 
20  See Council press release (www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/08/08-excessive-deficit-
portugal-spain/).  
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is widespread consensus that many member states need structural reforms to improve their 
functioning (e.g. higher output and employment) and their resilience.  
However, ‘structural reforms’ is a vast notion, which contains many different policy measures. 
In theory, structural reforms can be grouped into measures leading to (possibly large) 
redistributive effects (e.g. liberalisation of regulated sectors, reform of the labour market, 
pensions and taxation) and those aiming to improve efficiency (e.g. reform of the judicial 
system or the public administration). 
For the first group of reforms not only national ownership must be ensured, but such decisions 
have to be taken by a democratically elected government and reflect domestic political 
preferences. The EU cannot and should not perform that role.  
The second group of reforms can also have some redistributive side effects, but they chiefly 
focus on removing inefficiencies hindering administrative and institutional capacity. This is 
where the EU can play a role and provide support. The newly established Commission Structural 
Reform Support Service has been assigned precisely that task: “to help EU countries build more 
effective institutions, stronger governance frameworks and efficient public administrations. 
Such support reinforces the capacity of EU countries to design and implement policies to 
support job creation and sustainable growth.”21 
The experience of the crisis, not least the one in Greece, and of the Task Force for Greece has 
shown that passing laws in Parliament is not a sufficient condition for policy measures to 
deliver, if the administrative system is not able to implement changes. In general, member 
states with better institutional and administrative capacity proved to be either more resilient 
to large shocks or to be able to respond and overcome them more rapidly. 
5. National independent institutions, national ownership and the Semester 
Independent fiscal institutions (IFIs), or national fiscal councils, were created as part of the EU 
governance framework as a consequence of the Fiscal Compact, which is the fiscal component 
of the Treaty on Stability Coordination and Governance (TSCG), with the task of activating 
correction mechanisms in case of deviations from the balanced budget principle. But they are 
also part of the prescription of the Six- and Two-Pack. Despite different traditions, design and 
approaches, as of today, each euro area country, as well as several non-euro area member 
states, have an IFI.22 
                                                     
21 https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/structural-reform-support-service_en#responsibilities  
22 IFIs display a large heterogeneity across countries. In Austria the set-up of a national independent institution 
monitoring the government budgetary policies dates back to the 1970s. Italy and Greece were the last two 
countries to set up such an institution in 2014 and 2015, respectively. Despite institutional differences, all IFIs have 
a common mandate to improve fiscal policymaking and promote sound fiscal policy. In practice, this means 
producing or endorsing forecasts, monitoring the implementation of fiscal rules (many different kinds), assessing 
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The rationale for having such institutions, which de facto duplicate some of the monitoring 
tasks that are part of the Commission’s portfolio (fiscal arm) in the framework of the Semester, 
is to help impose discipline on national governments from inside the country. This should 
enhance the ownership of prudent fiscal policy and, as by-product, their legitimacy, which are 
two critical issues explaining the limited success of the Semester on fiscal matters.  
In principle, IFIs have also an advantage relative to the European Commission. They should have 
a better knowledge of the country and easier access to critical information. Moreover, they 
should be able to count on favourable public opinion to safeguard their independence in 
monitoring fiscal policy and allow them to reject potential political pressures. This naturally 
assumes that they are totally independent (i.e. as regards appointment procedures, resources 
and access to information) from the political decision-making procedures. 
The experience of IFIs is still too short to evaluate their achievements. Jankovics and Sherwood 
(2017) argue that IFIs seem to have already played a useful role in national budgetary 
processes, although some challenges remain. These relate to potential limits to independence 
safeguards and to access to information, as well as to the quality of the process of endorsement 
of government macroeconomic forecasts and possible conciliatory mechanisms. In countries 
where these institutions are young and the reputational cost to governments that defy IFIs’ 
recommendations is low, these challenges may be particularly strong.   
In principle, the national productivity boards (originally proposed by the European Commission 
as national competitiveness boards, in the follow-up to the Five Presidents Report in 2015)23 as 
defined by the Council,24 should be equivalent to the IFIs, but with a focus on a country’s 
performance and policies in the field of competitiveness. Not all member states at present have 
a domestic productivity board, but it is already envisaged that such institutions, once operative 
in all countries, should provide inputs to the Commission in the context of the European 
Semester. 
The creation of such institutions and their involvement in the Semester signal an attempt, more 
or less explicit, to move towards a more decentralised approach in the monitoring and 
surveillance activities, which are currently embedded in the European Semester and under the 
Commission’s control.  
There are two explanations for this shift. The first is based on short-term considerations and 
relates to the fact that as the effects of the crisis abate, the rationale for policy coordination 
declines and there is less willingness to give the Commission a role. The second reason is more 
                                                     
long-term sustainability, triggering correction mechanisms in case of deviation from fiscal targets and advising the 
government in relation to emerging risks. See European Parliament (2017e) for a complete overview of national 
fiscal bodies.  
23 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0601&from=EN  
24 www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/09/20-national-productivity-boards/?utm_source= 
dsms-auto&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=National+productivity+boards+backed+by+Council  
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fundamental and relates to the fact that for a number of reasons, as illustrated in section 3, 
economic policy coordination in the EU suffers important limitations, given its institutional 
setting. The Semester is largely perceived as a burden and a constraint on domestic choices 
and rules are only partially enforced. A decentralised approach clearly aims to eliminate such 
perceptions, possibly preserving the commitment and increasing the enforcement to sound 
fiscal policy through national ownership. However, the design still poses issues. 
National ownership is a widely used concept but its meaning is rather unclear. Vanheuverzwijn 
& Crespy (2017) attempt to define it by identifying three degrees of participation by national 
actors in the European Semester. Cognitive ownership is the lowest level and refers to the 
awareness by national actors of the Semester; political ownership, by contrast, implies an 
agreement over political objectives and a willingness to implement them. Lastly, institutional 
ownership denotes a situation in which national actors can shape policy-making outcomes. The 
recent innovations of the Semester towards fostering the dialogue with national stakeholders 
and having national independent institutions providing inputs in the Semester seem to go in 
the direction of more political and even institutional ownership.  
In this framework, the risk is that CSRs, which are driven by inputs coming from the national 
level, appear as an external (EU) product imposed on national governments and with which 
they have to comply. This scenario has two drawbacks. The first is that the Semester becomes 
a complicated game with little value added. National independent institutions should directly 
interact with their government. The second is that the involvement of the national independent 
institutions in the Semester may have a negative effect on the ‘reputation’ of IFIs, as national 
independent bodies, which could then be perceived as an arm of the EU operating in the 
national territory.  
While the objective of improving national ownership is very important, certain procedures 
could lead to perverse effects. Therefore, on the one hand, one should avoid the danger of 
duplication of tasks and further complication of an already-complex framework and, on the 
other hand, to preserve the independence of national independent institutions from both the 
national government and from the EU. This would require that they exercise true operational 
independence (i.e. as regards appointment procedures, resources, access to information, etc.).  
A last issue relates to how to reconcile the need to demonstrate national ownership with the 
need for coordination, understood as the common good of the Union, over and beyond the 
member states. The role of the Commission should consist of ensuring that the common 
interest is taken into consideration, vis-á-vis the national perspective defended by national 
institutions. As argued in section 3, this may be challenging but it is particularly relevant in times 
of crisis. 
6. Conclusions 
The European Semester was created in response to the crisis and had a specific purpose. The 
policy tools used as part of the Semester have been revisited, however, and the set of policies 
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included in the process has expanded over time. Conversely, the reasons why some policies, 
typically national ones, need to be monitored and coordinated at European level seem to be 
less important. This may result in an even-lower incentive for member states to engage in 
economic policy coordination. 
During the acute financial crisis, the supervision and coordination of economic policies were 
necessary because the spillover effects were large and in some cases the CSRs did have an 
impact. The incentive to coordinate are lowering, however, as it is now less likely that action by 
any one country will have a measurable impact on its partners, or on the system as a whole. In 
the context of a monetary union, this does not mean that coordination of fiscal policy, intended 
as a commitment to sound fiscal policy and an acceptance of surveillance, is unnecessary 
outside times of crisis. Experience has shown, however, that this argument has not been 
sufficient to deliver the coordination of national economic policies or the enforcement of rules. 
Looking ahead, presenting the European Semester (ES) as essential for achieving growth and 
convergence may turn out not to be desirable, unless such expectations can be met. CSRs, 
which are the main output of the ES, have seen decreasing implementation since the crisis has 
receded, even if the focus has shifted away from fiscal measures.  
The emphasis of the European Semester should shift from economic policy coordination to 
national ownership. In principle, this could be done by involving national, independent 
institutions in the formulation and monitoring of implementation of the CSRs. But this should 
occur without becoming a formal and complex game whereby governments decide the policy, 
the EU formulates the CSRs and governments have to implement them. This would not help 
ownership, or the implementation of rules. It is important that such institutions are fully 
perceived as independent – not only of the government but also of the EU level. 
Linking the budget to the reforms in the framework of the Semester should be avoided. The EU 
budget should be used to deal with common challenges and foster cohesion and convergence 
among EU regions.  
Moreover, reforms as such cannot be ‘bought’; it would be extremely difficult to measure the 
implementation of the CSRs precisely enough to make implementation a condition for certain 
funds. The role of the EU in relation to the reforms should consist of providing technical support 
to achieve the capacity in individual member state to design, manage and deliver on their own 
reform agendas.   
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